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“Benevolent Plans Meritoriously Applied:”
How Missouri Almost Became
an Indian Nation, 1803–1811
B Y  B .  J .  M C M A H O N
Maps such as these were 
published in the early 
nineteenth century to plot the 
general locations of Native 
American tribes.  Such a 
map as this would have been 
the best available information 
for Jefferson. (Image: 
Cartography Associates)
Spring/Summer 2014 | The Confluence | 5
In 1803, President Thomas Jefferson designed 
the first official American governmental policy of 
relocating Indians, one that encouraged them to become 
farmers and integrate into the United States as citizens. 
The Jeffersonian approach to Indian-white relations 
ostensibly planned for assimilation after the Natives 
voluntarily relocated to the west. Jefferson and his 
disciples had differing opinions about the Natives 
but believed they had the same rights to life, liberty, 
and property as the whites, and that they expected 
the United States to uphold honorably all treaties 
and obligations between them. While not the only 
advocate of the policy named in his honor, he was 
the first executive given the power and authority by 
Congress to treat Native Americans as he saw fit.2 
The president envisioned much of the area west of 
the Mississippi as a land where the Indians could 
live completely separated from white society east of 
the river. During this separation, Indians could then 
abandon their tribal ways and embrace so-called 
civilized agriculture. Once Indians conformed to 
the American ideal, they could ostensibly integrate 
into American culture. This vision for Missouri, 
however, completely failed. By 1838, Americans 
of European descent claimed the entirety of 
the state. The removal of indigenous peoples 
from Missouri occurred in a short span of 
time, fewer than twenty years 
after statehood. This 
diaspora is a 
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…to carry on the benevolent plans which have been so meritoriously applied 
to the conversion of our aboriginal neighbors from the degradation and 
wretchedness of savage life to a participation of the improvements of which the 
human mind and manners are susceptible in a civilized state.
 — James Madison, 
  First Inaugural Address, 4 March 18091
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remarkable, if ignoble, feat considering that more than a 
dozen tribes comprised of thousands of individuals either 
hunted or lived in the territory of Missouri. However, 
continuous violence, the failure to fulfill promises made 
to the Indians, and the inability to bind the tribes in total 
economic dependence on the United States all contributed 
to the failure of Jefferson’s vision leading to the eventual 
triumph of the Jacksonian Ideal of forced removal.
Jefferson believed the Missouri Territory represented 
an excellent opportunity to solve the “Indian problem.” 
To most Americans, the Natives were a chaotic, barely 
post–Stone Age people who occupied, but did not own or 
improve, their land. The Jefferson Ideal envisioned turning 
a hunter-gatherer people into citizen-farmers by ending 
savage behavior and peacefully enticing all Eastern tribes 
to move voluntarily west of the Mississippi. Not only 
would this transfer end conflict in the Appalachian region 
and Northwest Territory, it would give the Indians several 
generations away from encroaching white settlers, to learn, 
with the help of missionaries, teachers, and cultural agents, 
the benefits of the American agricultural civilization.3 
Jefferson’s goal of integration, however, was 
achievable only if several conditions became reality. The 
first was to induce all the eastern tribes to move west of 
the Mississippi River. Second, inter-tribal warfare, as 
well as raids against white settlements, needed to cease. 
Third, the Indians must, after moving, remain separated 
from all white populations while adapting to an agrarian 
culture. The division transcended mere racism. Jefferson 
was aware that unscrupulous traders were willing to sell 
alcohol and firearms to Natives, a volatile combination 
that often led to tragedy. He also wanted to keep other 
European powers from weaning the tribes away from 
American dependency. If Britain or Spain continued 
to supply and trade with the Natives, the entire plan 
failed. The Jefferson Ideal was more optimistic than 
realistic, for there were too many unforeseen variables 
unfolding to overcome, and too many assumptions about 
the cooperative nature of humanity. One of the glaring 
problems was that the majority of the white population 
never accepted tribes that successfully adopted the mores 
of the larger American society. Not surprisingly, a culture 
that casually overlooked the enslavement of Africans 
did not easily embrace coexistence with others not of 
European descent. In 1804, however, President Jefferson 
had reason to believe in his plan’s eventual success. 
The integration was possible, to Jefferson’s way of 
thinking, because he believed the North American Indian 
was equal in mind and body to the European. As early as 
1785, in a letter to Francois-Jean de Chastellux, an officer 
with the French expeditionary forces fighting against 
the British, the future president disputed the naturalist 
Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon’s assessment 
of the Indian as an inferior. In an 1802 correspondence to 
Brother Handsome Lake, a Seneca war chief, Jefferson 
declared the United States would not force Indians to sell 
their land, nor allow private citizens to purchase directly 
from the tribes. This promise became federal law that same 
year.4
During his presidency (1801-1809), Thomas Jefferson 
(1743-1826) was instrumental in shaping federal Indian 
policy. By purchasing Louisiana from France, he also 
acquired a place to which the United States could move 
native tribes.  Jefferson was also a great advocate of the 
factory system, and expanded it during his presidency.  
(Image: Library of Congress)
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Jefferson’s ideas on white-Indian relations came not 
only from his own experiences and ideas but also from 
previous presidential strategies and English and American 
legislation. Section IX of the Articles of Confederation 
granted Congress the sole right to manage all dealings, 
including trade, with the Indians, as long as it did not 
supersede the rights of the individual states. The Ordinance 
for the Regulation and Management of Indian Affairs 
in 1786 established three Indian districts governed by 
superintendents responsible for implementing government 
policy. Article III in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 
read, 
The utmost good faith shall always 
be observed toward the Indians; their 
lands and property shall never be taken 
from them without their consent . . . 
they never shall be invaded or disturbed, 
unless in just and lawful wars authorized 
by Congress; but laws founded in justice 
and humanity shall … be made for … 
When Samuel Lewis published this map as “The Travellers Guide” in 1819, Missouri’s application for statehood was 
still pending before Congress.  Two years later, it would be the first state to enter the union that was entirely west of the 
Mississippi in the Louisiana Purchase.  (Image: Cartography Associates)
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preserving peace and friendship with 
them.5 
To those who followed the Jefferson ideal, the Indians 
also had inalienable rights, among them life, liberty, and 
especially, property. 
After the United States adopted the Constitution in 
1789, Congress continued the policies begun under the 
Articles. The only other important legislation dealing with 
Native Americans in the last decade of the eighteenth 
century was the Intercourse Act of 1790, which forbade 
trading with Indians unless a private citizen obtained a 
trading license, issuable only by the president, Secretary 
of War, or one of the Indian Affairs superintendents. 
The statute also prohibited committing crimes against, 
or trespassing upon, any “friendly” Indians or their 
property, and more importantly, disallowed any private 
citizen or state from purchasing land from Natives. 
Another Intercourse Act in 1802, urged upon Congress 
by Jefferson and based loosely on King George III of 
England’s Proclamation of 1763, set the final stage for 
American-Indian relations until the 1830s. This law 
established the Mississippi River as the official boundary 
line between whites and Indians, forbade Americans from 
hunting or entering the western territory without prior 
permission, prohibited white settlement upon Indian lands, 
and established the death penalty for the killing of an 
Indian. It also forbade anyone except a duly authorized 
government agent from forging treaties with the Natives, 
and it transferred power in dealing with the Indians from 
Congress to the president, granting the executive branch 
the sole discretion to deal with indigenous peoples as that 
office saw fit. While some of the provisions in the act 
changed after the Louisiana Purchase, the last two points 
remained in full effect, explaining why presidential policy 
was so important to Indians.6
Legislatively, Jefferson’s proposal for voluntary 
Indian removal became law in March 1804. The Removal 
Act divided the Louisiana Territory into two governmental 
regions: one controlled through New Orleans, the other 
centered in St. Louis. The Act also confirmed the right 
of the executive branch to establish trading houses in 
the territory as well as granting Indian leaders food and 
protection should they so choose to visit the president. 
Section 15 of this provision granted the president the 
ability to negotiate with the Indians for land east of 
the Mississippi in exchange for land west of the river, 
provided the tribe remove itself and settle on the new 
property. In doing so, the tribe placed itself under 
protection of the United States and therefore could no 
longer enter into agreements with any other foreign power, 
state, or individual. The transactions were voluntary; there 
is no mention of compulsion of any kind. This legislation 
served as the basis for Indian removal until 1830 when it 
was replaced, at the behest of President Andrew Jackson, 
with an act that gave the federal government the legal 
power to remove to the west those tribes who refused to 
relocate under the 1804 law.7 
The Osage was the major tribe in Missouri, and it had 
a reputation among the Spanish and surrounding Natives 
as both fearsome warriors and uncooperative neighbors. 
Despite white fears to the contrary, however, the various 
Osage tribes proved receptive to American overtures. The 
estimated non-Indian population living in Missouri in 
1804 was 6,500 whites, with a potential 2,000 available 
for militia duty, as well as 1,380 slaves. There were 
various estimates as to the number of Osage still residing 
in Missouri, but it was generally believed to be at least 
equal to the white population, not including thousands of 
Natives from other nations within the borders. Americans 
wanted closer ties with the Osage, not only for the 
lucrative fur trade but also because both Spain and Great 
Britain actively sought alliances with them. The threat of 
European interference from both of those empires was a 
real and tangible fear that overshadowed the first ten years 
of Osage-American relations in Missouri.8
After meeting with several key Osage leaders in 
July 1804, Jefferson promised a trading factory9 for 
the Osage. The factory system began in March 1795 
when Congress authorized trading houses to supply 
the Natives with goods in return for furs. The factories 
appropriated the Indian trade from the private business 
sector and ostensibly placed it exclusively in the hands 
Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707-1788), 
influenced at least two generations of naturalists through 
his writings while the head of the Jardin du Roi (now the 
Jardin des Plantes) in Paris.  He was also a proponent 
of monogenism, thinking that all races came from a 
common origin, which influenced some thinkers in their 
work on Indian relations. (Image: Mary Ambler Archives, 
Lindenwood University)
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of the government. Designed to secure the friendship and 
goodwill of the Indians, factories enabled the government 
to limit Native access to alcohol and some firearms. By 
law, factory traders provided quality goods to the Indians 
at cost, a rule not applied to the private businessmen who 
overcharged the Indians whenever possible. Factories also 
became bloodless weapons by withholding goods from 
hostile tribes, thus providing the blueprint for economic 
sanctions.10 
The executive branch had exclusive power over 
the factories, empowered to place them anywhere in the 
United States and hire agents to run them. The agents 
reported to the Treasury Department, swore oaths of 
scrupulousness, were required to keep accurate records, 
and, beginning in 1806, to file quarterly reports. Never 
designed as a permanent solution, the factory system 
required periodic approval from Congress to continue 
operations. The Trading House Act of 1806 authorized 
the president to establish factories outside the borders of 
the United States and directly preceded the establishment 
of factories in Missouri. To Jefferson, the trading house 
program was the essential lynchpin for the success of his 
voluntary Indian removal policy. In a letter to Indiana 
Territory Governor William Henry Harrison dated 
February 27, 1803, the president outlined his goals by 
alluding to the public record, but informing the governor 
that because this communique “—being unofficial and 
private, I may with safety give you a more extensive view 
of our policy respecting the Indians.”11 
In this letter, Jefferson explained to Harrison that in 
order to achieve the goal of “perpetual peace with the 
Indian,” the United States must pursue friendly relations 
and do everything legally and morally possible to protect 
them from injuries inflicted on them by Americans. It was 
imperative, Jefferson continued, that the Indians become 
civilized farmers (men) and weavers (women). To become 
farmers, the government must induce the Indians to leave 
their vast hunting and gathering territory to accept small 
The Northwest Ordinance is among the most significant documents in American constitutional history, in that it established 
a model for organizing western territories that became the foundation for western settlement.  That settlement also put the 
United States government in conflict with the tribes already living there. (Image: Library of Congress)
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parcels of private property. The best way to achieve this 
goal was through trading houses established by men of 
probity. The goal of these trading houses, he explained, 
was not profit but rather to ensure Indian reliance on 
white goods. Either the Natives would use the tools of 
civilization wisely as farmers or become so indebted by 
their reliance on American goods that their only recourse 
would be to sell tribal lands. In this way, tribes either 
would join the United States as citizens or trade land 
in the east for land west of the Mississippi River. This 
policy of indebting the Indians in order to induce them to 
move, Jefferson asserted, was the humane way of solving 
the problem of uncivilized Indians within the nation’s 
borders.12
Between 1808 and 1822 Missouri had five factories: 
Fort Osage, Arrow Rock (near the Osage River), Belle 
Fontaine (near St. Louis), Marais de Cygnes (near 
Missouri’s western border), and Fort Johnson (near 
Hannibal). The items Indians most desired included 
blankets, jewelry, rouge (war paint), kitchen utensils, 
groceries (salt, sugar, flour, raisins, tea, coffee), drugs 
and medicines, tobacco, pipes, guns, and powder. While 
the factories offered agricultural supplies, few tribes took 
advantage of them. The Indians could purchase anything 
they desired from the factories, with the exception of 
playing cards and alcohol, by placing an order with the 
trading agent. To pay for the purchase of desired goods, 
Indians in Missouri provided all types of furs and pelts.13 
Natives also produced goods that many Americans desired, 
such as deer tallow, bear oil, beeswax, feathers, snakeroot, 
lead, maple sugar, cattle, cotton, corn, feather mats, buffalo 
horns, deer antlers, and handicrafts. The Osage buffalo 
tallow candles, for example, were so popular that even the 
White House in Washington used them.14 
The first factory in Missouri at Fort Belle Fountaine, 
or Bellefountaine, located about fifteen miles west of St. 
Louis, opened in 1805. Fort Belle Fountaine was also the 
first factory west of the Mississippi River, and the first 
American fort as well. Designed to serve the needs of 
the Sac and Fox, Ioway, and Osage tribes, it proved too 
distant from any of those tribes to conduct regular trade. 
In addition, raids against each other, as well as white 
settlements, continued by all three tribes during their treks 
to and from the factory. To separate the tribes, the War 
Department authorized the building of two new factories 
closer to each Native settlement, Fort Madison in Iowa, 
and Fort Osage in Missouri.15
The responsibility for implementation of this policy 
fell to America’s most famous explorers. In 1807, 
Meriwether Lewis became governor of the Louisiana 
Territory, and William Clark became a brigadier general 
and Superintendent of Indian Affairs for all tribes west of 
the Mississippi, with the exception of the Osage. Lewis, 
however, was little interested in tribal affairs and gladly let 
Clark deal with the Natives. Thus began Clark’s long and 
illustrious career as America’s premier Indian diplomat. 
Clark’s job was not an easy one, for he constantly had 
to deal with tensions, sometimes even outright violence, 
between western tribes and newly arrived natives form the 
east.16
The purpose of Fort Osage was, like all factories, to 
cement Native reliance upon the United States. Since the 
Osage tribes lived exclusively west of the Mississippi, the 
intention was not to entice them to move but rather to cede 
When the Jefferson administration authorized the creation 
of Fort Osage, Indian Agent William Clark traveled west to 
meet with the Osage, sign a treaty, and establish the fort.  
The original fort was Clark’s design, pictured here. (Image: 
Mary Ambler Archives, Lindenwood University)
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their claims to land in Missouri so that eastern tribes could 
settle there. Both Governor Lewis and the Secretary of War 
also instructed Clark to stop the Osage from conducting 
raids on whites and other tribes. The new superintendent 
believed the threat of ending the trade upon which that 
tribe depended for survival would be sufficient enticement 
to accomplish this daunting task.17
William Clark authored more Indian treaties than 
any other individual in American history. The first one 
was with the Osage in 1808. With this treaty, the Osage 
ceded three quarters of the land that comprised Missouri 
to the United States. As a Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 
William Clark had full authority to conduct negotiations 
with all Indians in the Louisiana Purchase Territory and 
forward any agreements reached to Congress for approval. 
Between 1808 and 1825, he negotiated five more treaties 
with the Osage in Missouri.18
When 1808 began, the Osage were at war with the 
Western Shawnees, Delawares, Kickapoos, Sioux, Ioways, 
and Sacs and Foxes. Clark, charged with maintaining 
peace in Missouri, moved to St. Louis to end the fighting. 
The frontier town suited the superintendent well, and 
he remained a citizen of that city for the rest of his life, 
even after retiring from government service. For the 
present, however, he was frustrated with the Osage’s 
unwillingness to end their raids against other tribes. This 
constant raiding among the Indians sometimes spilled 
over and involved white settlers, encouraging the first 
public rumblings against Indian removal from the Missouri 
Valley. At the urging of Frederick Bates, Secretary of the 
Louisiana Territory and later second governor of the state 
of Missouri, the president reluctantly agreed to military 
retaliation for the first time against the Osage. Governor 
Lewis, anxious to maintain peace, sent a message to 
several Osage chiefs informing them that if raids did 
not stop, trade between the two nations would cease and 
their tribe with the declared outside of the United States’ 
protection. Due to the high profitability of the Osage fur 
trade, the American government until this time had done 
everything short of military involvement to discourage 
attacks. With this missive, however, Governor Lewis let 
the Osage know he was willing to ignore attacks on the 
Big and Little by the many enemy tribes that surrounded 
the Osage.19
 To avoid forced military involvement, Superintendent 
Clark quickly proceeded with his plans to build a factory 
close to the Osage. A firm Jeffersonian, he believed the 
quickest and best way to end Native raids was irrevocably 
to bind them to economic dependence on the federal 
government. He was also concerned about the influence 
of the British, whose traders had for years surreptitiously 
made overtures to the Osage, and the Spanish, who, 
although their influence had greatly waned, still posed 
a threat of alliance with Native tribes in the area. In 
August 1808, Clark, along with a military force under the 
command of Daniel Boone’s son, Nathan, and the man the 
superintendent chose to run the factory, a fellow believer 
in the Jeffersonian ideal, George Sibley, arrived at the bluff 
on the Missouri River described in the Lewis and Clark 
expedition journals five years earlier.20
While the fort and factory were under construction 
in September 1808, invitations to trade at the post were 
sent to Natives from several surrounding tribes, including 
the Osage, Kansa, Oto, Maha, Pawnee, Sioux, Ioway, 
and Sac and Fox. At first, only the Osage responded. On 
September13, eighty Osage arrived from two villages, 
and Clark immediately held a council with the Indians, 
with Pierre Chouteau and his friends Paul Loise and Noel 
Magrain acting as interpreters. Clark explained to the 
Osage that due to “theft, murder, and robory [sic] on the 
Fort Osage remained an Indian trade factory site until Congress disbanded the factory system in 1822. The original fort in 
Sibley, Missouri, east of present-day Kansas City, has been recreated by Jackson County Parks.  (Image: Jean De Moss)
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Citizens of the U.S. in this Territory … I shall propose 
a line to be run between the U.S. and the Osage hunting 
lands ….” This line, the superintendent explained, would 
begin at the fort and run south to the Arkansas River, and 
all land south of the Missouri River and east of this line 
would be “given up by the Osage to the U.S. forever.”21
 The Osage agreed, and everyone met again on 
September 14 to sign the treaty Clark had written 
overnight. The superintendent carefully read the provisions 
of the treaty to the gathered Osage, after which Clark and 
Sibley, both anxious to preserve the honor and good faith 
of the United States, independently wrote that the Natives 
eagerly signed. The twelve articles contained the following 
provisions: The fort would provide protection to the Osage 
who dwelt near it, and the factory would provide goods 
as long as the Natives conducted themselves in a friendly, 
peaceable, and honest manner toward the citizens of the 
United States and their allies. No other tribe could trade 
at the factory unless they had “smoked the Pipe of Peace” 
with the Osage.22 Furthermore, the United States agreed to 
furnish the tribe with a blacksmith and mill, pay the tribes 
a lump sum for the land as well as a yearly indemnity, 
minus compensation for any thefts or raid damages caused 
by members of the tribes, and assume liability for all legal 
claims made against the Natives.23 
 With his work completed, Clark headed back to 
St. Louis, leaving the yet-to-be completed fort under 
command of Captain Eli Clemson and the factory under 
sole responsibility of George Sibley. However, this first 
version signed at the fort was never ratified. Several Osage 
chiefs, including the dominant war chief, Big Soldier, were 
absent in September. Clark arranged for a meeting with 
the remaining Osage leaders and presented them with a 
similar treaty signed at the fort. Because they had never 
been defeated in battle, many of the remaining Osage were 
reluctant. It took a year and the threat of a trade embargo 
to convince the remaining chiefs to sign. The main 
difference between the two versions was the addition of a 
few more miles to the Osage territory around the fort, and 
the removal of a special, and illegal, land grant for himself 
that Pierre Chouteau had included when transcribing 
the original treaty. Congress ratified the second treaty in 
1810, and with it the American government purchased, at 
about ten cents an acre, fifty thousand square miles of land 
that included three-quarters of Missouri and the northern 
half of Arkansas. The only land the Osage still retained 
exclusively for themselves in Missouri was a band fifty 
George Sibley (1782-1863) served as factor at the Indian 
trade factory embedded in Fort Osage from its founding 
in 1808 until Congress disbanded the factory system in 
1822.  It was the only trade factory that showed a profit on 
every report to Washington. (Image: Mary Ambler Archives, 
Lindenwood University)
Besides founding St. Louis with his stepfather, Pierre Laclede, 
Auguste Chouteau (1749-1829) was among the prominent 
citizens of St. Louis in the early nineteenth century.  He was 
a dominant figure in the lucrative St. Louis fur trade, so he 
knew a great deal about the tribes on the lower Missouri 
River.  He was a key source of such information for William 
Clark and Meriwether Lewis before leaving on their trek in 
1804 as well.  (Image: Henry Hyde and Howard Conard, 
Encyclopedea of the History of St. Louis, 1899; Mary 
Ambler Archives, Lindenwood University)
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miles wide running vertically along the western border 
from the Missouri River to the Arkansas border.24 
President Jefferson, finishing his last remaining 
months in office, believed his plan for voluntary Indian 
removal was unfolding successfully, and his successor, 
James Madison, was content to continue his predecessor’s 
policy. The white population west of the Mississippi River 
grew fast. In 1810 there were 20,845 American citizens, 
concentrated mainly around New Orleans and St. Louis. In 
Missouri, Clark’s expectations of a cessation of intertribal 
fighting did not take place. While the Osage had agreed 
to give up settling the eastern portion of the region, they 
still claimed hunting rights in the Ozarks, and bands of 
hunters often could not resist raiding the settlements of 
relocated eastern tribes. Some of the immigrant tribes 
conducted raids of their own. In 1810, for example, a band 
of Potawatomis killed four Americans near Boone’s Lick, 
Missouri. At Fort Osage, close to five thousand Indians 
gathered to live and trade, and as tribes historically hostile 
to the Big and Little arrived, tensions flared. A tribe of one 
thousand Kansa Indians proved so violent and insolent 
that Sibley barred them from the factory. Others who 
had “smoked the Pipe of Peace” with the Osage and thus 
were allowed to trade included Otoes, Mahas, Pawnees, 
Missourias, Sioux, Ioways, and even Sacs and Foxes. Not 
all of the Osage were happy living among so many former 
enemies, however, and in 1811 many of them moved south 
to live along the Marias des Cygnes River. During this 
same year, Clark allowed the Osage to attack Ioway tribes 
who harassed white settlers north of the Missouri River. 
Even the peaceful Shawnee living along the Mississippi 
River were beginning to be viewed with suspicion, 
especially when it became known that Tecumseh, a 
war chief allied with the British in the Ohio Valley, had 
visited the settlements attempting to recruit warriors. 
The Missouri Shawnee rejected the overtures, however, 
preferring to live in peace with their white neighbors.25 
Despite occasional horse and property theft, Indian 
attacks on whites in Missouri before the War of 1812 were 
rare. In 1806, two Kickapoo were hanged in St. Louis 
for killing an American near the Osage River. While a 
third Indian was implicated, President Jefferson’s policies 
forbade the execution of more than two Natives for the 
killing of one white. In 1809, President Monroe pardoned 
two Sac Indians on the recommendation of William Clark 
in return for a promise by the tribe for better behavior 
in the future. Whites who killed Indians did not face 
indictment, although Clark often paid the injured tribe an 
indemnity against any future retaliation. Unless it affected 
trade or white settlements, the government ignored Indian-
on-Indian violence in the territory except when the Natives 
themselves sought legal aid. This supplication for white 
justice happened nine times before Missouri statehood, 
and, in two cases in 1806, resulted in execution. This lack 
of concern by the majority of whites only encouraged 
intertribal violence. As the white population continued to 
grow and expand, however, they invariably became the 
target for more and more raids.26 
By 1811, the Jeffersonian ideal of peaceful, voluntary 
removal from the east to the west, where the Indians 
would become farmers, still seemed a viable goal. Already, 
several tribes had relocated to Missouri, which now 
was home not only to the Osage, but also the Kaskaskia 
(an Illini tribe), Ioway, Delaware, Shawnee, Sac, Fox, 
Miami, Kickapoo, Wea, and even some Cherokee along 
the southern border. Trade at Fort Osage was brisk and 
relatively free of problems. Although there were white 
settlers in the territory, there were not enough to cause 
many clashes with the relocated and resident Natives. 
There were, however, storm clouds gathering on the 
horizon. British traders, indifferent to Jefferson’s plans, 
countered much of the factory’s influence. Jay’s Treaty 
of 1794 allowed British traders to ply their goods on 
American soil as long as they obeyed federal law. The 
British often hinted, or even told the Natives, that the 
United States wanted to take all of their lands. In addition, 
they often supplied superior goods, were willing to extend 
credit, and would trade whiskey. The latter two were not 
allowed in the American system.27 
Although government factories were essential to 
indebt the Indians, private traders, once they obtained a 
license, could also trade with the Natives. The competition 
created a problem because the factories were necessary 
to the Jefferson ideal to “civilize” the Natives, while 
private traders were only interested in profit. In Missouri, 
the dominant traders were Auguste and Pierre Chouteau, 
Manuel Lisa, Joseph Robidoux (founder of St. Joseph), 
and John Jacob Astor, who was quickly growing in 
influence and wealth. These private traders, especially 
Astor, were a greater threat to the Jeffersonian factory 
system than the British. When Congress finally ended 
the factory system in 1822, it also destroyed any hope of 
achieving the Jeffersonian ideal.28 
 By 1811, the British military also posed a threat 
to Jefferson’s plans. The failure by the United States 
economically or militarily to enforce peace gave many 
tribes the false idea that the English would support 
traditional Native existence. As Great Britain attempted 
to draw different tribes across the Ohio Valley and Old 
Northwest into an alliance against the United States, 
Superintendent Clark and others were acutely aware of the 
danger of something similar happening in Missouri. Clark 
sent George Sibley to the Platte River area to convince 
the Natives, especially the Pawnee, to continue their 
friendly relations with the United States. Although the 
Western Shawnee had rejected Tecumseh’s overtures, the 
superintendent seriously considered “dispersing” the tribe 
across the territory just in case. The Osage seemed content 
with their American alliance, but the tribe was notorious 
for ignoring promises of peaceful cohabitation. The 
proximity of the Sac and Fox tribes posed an immediate 
threat to St. Louis. Not only were their settlements near, 
but many of the Natives had never forgiven the United 
States for the Treaty of 1804. If war came with Britain, 
Clark was certain many Sacs and Foxes would ally with 
America’s enemy.29 
From 1803 to 1811, the Jeffersonian ideal seemed 
the perfect solution to American-Native relations. The 
14 | The Confluence | Spring/Summer 2014
War of 1812 and its aftermath across the Mississippi 
River basin, however, ended for many the optimistic 
hope for peaceful coexistence. Even nature itself seemed 
intent on proclaiming the coming change. On December 
16, 1811, and again on February 7, 1812, earthquakes 
devastated lands along the New Madrid fault line. The 
powerful shocks were felt as far away as Quebec and New 
York and caused the Mississippi River to briefly flow 
A number of artists traveled from St. Louis westward and portrayed native tribes, but Europeans were fascinated by them as 
well.  They were portrayed here in a French newspaper in 1827.  (Image: State Historical Society of Missouri)
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backwards. The quakes seemed to mark a watershed for 
Indian-white relations in Missouri, heralding the end of 
semi-equanimity and marking the beginning of dominance 
by those of European descent.30 In the years following 
that catastrophic event, the Jefferson ideal of voluntary 
assimilation rapidly fell apart. The end of the War of 
1812 forever ended any British interest in allying with the 
Indians of the plains; thus, the United States no longer 
had to compete for cooperation, leaving the Natives little 
recourse but to accept whatever deal was proposed to them 
by the whites. The rapid influx of white settlers in the 
decades after the war quickly overwhelmed the relatively 
small number of Natives in the Missouri territory. Indian 
raids were now met with swift and terrible retribution. The 
disintegration of the relatively benevolent government 
trade monopoly into the hands of private individuals with 
almost no interest in the welfare of the Natives quickly 
destroyed any remaining dignity or culture they might 
have had left. While Jefferson may or may not have 
believed in his own plan or whether it was simply the most 
expedient way to clear tribes from east of the Mississippi 
is unclear. What is certain is that his immediate successors 
formulated no better or even a different plan. The result 
was that within a few short decades, all remaining Indians 
in Missouri were expelled, forced to move even further 
westward by a society that defined the words “benevolent 
plans meritoriously applied” differently from the previous 
generation.
Manuel Lisa’s home in St. Louis was also home for his fur-
trading business, competing with the Chouteaus.  Lisa had 
families in both St. Louis and among the Osage.  (Image: 
Library of Congress)
St. Louis was a remarkably diverse place in some ways in 
the early nineteenth century.  Although founded by French 
nationals in 1764, it was held by the Spanish until the start 
of the nineteenth century, then became part of the United 
States in 1804.  Manuel Lisa (1772-1820) ranked as one 
of St. Louis’ prominent Spanish fur traders. (Image: Missouri 
History Museum)
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